Of these, only the second need be considered.

"Where a devise in a will is clear, it is incumbent on those who contend that it is not to take effect by reason of a revocation in a codicil, to show that the intention to revoke is equally clear and free from doubt as the original to devise. The law thus laid down has been recognized and acted upon as an established rule in numerous subsequent cases;"

1 Williams on Executors, 185 (7th ed.), and notes.

An analogy may be found in the rules of construction of statutes. A statute and its supplement are taken as one statute, just as a will and its codicil are taken as one instrument. The provisions of both are, if possible, to be harmoniously construed, and a repeal by implication is invariably struggled against by the courts. For this, it would be superfluous to cite authority.

It remains only to observe that there are reasons why the English cases should favor the heir at law, which do not exist here. "They owe their origin," said Taney, Ch. J., in Bosley *vs.* Bosley, 14 Howard, 397, "to the principles of the feudal system, which always favored the heir at law, because it was its policy to perpetuate large estates in the same family. * * It has not been the disposition of courts of justice, in modern times, to extend the application of these rigid technical rules, but rather to carry out the intention of the testator, where no fixed rule of legal interpretation stands in the way. And this is, or ought to be, more especially the case in this country."

"10. The testator having, by his will, devised his whole estate in trust for the uses of a library, any subsequent direction to expend any part thereof in the purchase