

cially, the whole of what one of the four deeds purported to appoint in her favor beneficially, and that *the main and governing view which he had in executing them was to enable the income at least, of part of the property, to be appointed, employed, or withheld in a manner not warranted by either of these powers.*" L. J. Bruce in same volume.

"It has been pressed upon me, more especially by the counsel for the Duke, that I cannot decide in favor of the plaintiff without holding, either, first, that the appointments already made in favor of Lady Harriet, being tainted with illegality by reason of the circumstances under which, and the purposes for which they were made, it was impossible for the Duke to make fresh appointments in her favor free from the same taint of illegality; or, secondly, that I must discredit the statements made by the Duke's answer and affidavit.

"I do not find myself under any obligation to accept either alternative. As to the first, *without saying that it is impossible to set what was wrong right, and to make any subsequent appointment free from the taint, I hold that it was necessary, in order to set it right, that something should have been done and said, clearly, unambiguously, and sufficiently, to disconnect the new appointment from the old understanding—from the old purpose—from the old influences—which rendered the old appointment illegal and void; and that merely executing a new deed, and sending a dry, formal, official lawyer's letter to the appointee, informing her of the new appointment, and of the legal effect of the instrument, were not sufficient for the purpose.*

"And, on the second point, I hold that every man must be presumed to intend and mean that which is the natural and necessary effect of his acts.

"Now, when the new deeds of appointment were made, things stood thus:—

"The Duke had said in his answer in the former suit, this: "When the said deeds poll of the 19th of December, 1854, were executed by me, I fully intended that from and after the execution thereof the defendant, Lady Harriet Cavendish Bentinck, should receive the whole of the dividends or income and annuity thereby appointed to her: and I was aware when and before such appointments were made that the said defendant, Lady Harriet Cavendish Bentinck, would have, and I intended that she should have the power, if she thought fit to exercise it, of dealing with, and disposing of, the whole of the dividends, yearly income, and annuity, as her own moneys. But the said appointments were made in consequence of the marriage of the plaintiff, and as the only mode by which, as I was informed, the immediate and absolute vesting in the plaintiff of a share of the dividends or income