

tion of rank and condition is inevitable, or useful in society; and if so, whether this subordination should not rather subsist between individuals, than particular bodies; whether it should not rather circulate through the whole body politic, than be confined to one part; and rather than be perpetual, should it not be incessantly produced and destroyed. Be these as they may, I assert that the punishment of a nobleman should in no wise differ from that of the lowest member of society.

EVERY lawful distinction, either in honours or riches, supposes previous equality, founded on the laws, on which all the members of society are considered as being equally dependant. We should suppose that men, in renouncing their natural despotism, said, *the wisest and most industrious among us shall obtain the greatest honours, and his dignity shall descend to his posterity. The fortunate, and happy, may hope for greater honours, but let him not therefore be less afraid, than others, of violating those conditions, on which he is exalted.* It is true indeed that no such de-