

As no troops in the world were, in any age, so well disciplined, it was hardly possible that in a battle, how unfortunate soever, but some Romans must rally in one part or other of it; or on the other side, but that the enemy must be defeated in some part of the field: and, indeed, we find every where in history, that whenever the Romans happened to be overpowered at the beginning, either by numbers, or the fierceness of the onset, they at last wrested the lawrel out of the enemies hand.

Their chief care was to examine, in what particular their enemies had an advantage over them, and when this was found, they immediately rectified it. The cutting swords (*a*) of the Gauls, and the elephants of Pyrrhus intimidated them but once. They strengthened their cavalry, (*b*) first, by taking the bridles from the horses; that their impetuosity might be boundless, and afterwards by intermixing them with Velites (*c*): when they understood the excellence of the Spanish (*d*) sword, they quitted

(*a*) The Romans used to present their javelins, when the Gauls struck at them with their swords, and by that means blunted them.

(*b*) At the time that they warred against the lesser nations of Italy, their horse was superior to that of their enemies, and for this reason, the cavalry were composed of none but the ablest bodied men, and the most considerable among the citizens, each of whom had a horse maintained at the public expence. When they alighted, no infantry was more formidable, and they very often turned the scale of victory.

(*c*) These were young men lightly armed, and the most nimble of all the legion. At the least signal that was given, they would either leap behind a horseman, or fight on foot. Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. Livy, lib. xxvi.

(*d*) Fragment, of Polybius cited by Suidas in the word *μαχαίρα*.