

particular occasions. So that if the Prince is a person of only common capacity and attention, he will always be able to support himself in his State, except he is driven out of it by some irresistible and more than ordinary force: and even in that case he will be sure to recover it, whenever the Usurper meets with any check or disaster in the career of his fortune. Of this Italy affords us a memorable example in the Duke of Ferrara [g], who was enabled to make so brave a stand against the Venetians when they invaded his dominions in the year 1484, and against Pope Julius II. in 1510, merely by having been so long established in the possession of that Duchy. For a natural Prince neither lies under any necessity, nor can have any motive to oppress or disgust his subjects: from whence it must follow of course, that he will be more beloved by them than another, except some enormous vices should happen to make him odious. Besides, the long succession and duration of his government abolish both the causes and memory of innovations [b]: for one change generally leaves a *toothing* (as it is called in buildings) and aptitude for another [i].

[g] This was Alphonso d'Este, whom Julius II. excommunicated, and endeavoured to deprive of his Dukedom.

[b] According to Tacitus, people find more inconvenience in trying a new Prince, than in keeping one whom they had before: "Minore discrimine fumi Principem quam quæri." *Hist.* i.

[i] Examples are generally improved upon, as Paterculus says, "non enim ibi consistunt exempla unde cœperunt, sed quamlibet in tenuem recepta tramitem latissimè evagandi sibi viam faciunt." *Hist.* ii. Tacitus gives us two pregnant instances, how apt one change is to occasion another. "Libertatem & Consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Dictaturæ ad tempus sumebantur: neque Decem-viralis potestas ultra biennium, neque Tribunorum militum consulare jus diu valuit. Non Cinnae, non Sullae longa Dominatio; & Pompeii Crassique potentia in Cæsarem; Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere." *Annal.* i. i. e. Lucius Brutus first instituted Consuls, and set up a free government in Rome, after the expulsion of Kings. Sometimes a Dictator was created for a while, but his power expired as soon as the people were out of danger. The Decemviri did not continue in office above two Years; neither did the Consular power of military Tribunes last long. The Domination of Cinna, and the Dictatorship of Sylla, were but of short duration. The Power of Crassus and Pompey were soon united in the person of Julius Cæsar their Colleague; and the authority of Lepidus and Marc Anthony in that of Augustus. This is a remarkable series of changes. Here follows the other. "Sulla Dictator abolitis vel conversis prioribus; cum plura addisset, otium ei rei haud in longum paravit. Statim turbidis Lepidi rogationibus, neque multo post Tribunis redditâ licentiâ quoquo vellent populum agitandi. Jamque non modo in commune sed in singulos homines latæ quæstiones. . . . Exin continua per viginti annos discordia, non mos, non jus." *Annal.* iii. i. e. Sylla the Dictator, either changed or abolished the Laws made by Gracchus and Saturninus, in order to establish others of his own making: but the turbulence of the times did not suffer them to continue long in force. For Lepidus, and soon after the Tribunes, having recovered their former power, began to harass the people at their pleasure, with new Laws and oppressions; so that without any regard to the good of the public, there were almost as

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