they engage in, and still persist in them, they certainly deserve both censure and ridicule. If the King of France therefore was powerful enough to have invaded the Kingdom of Naples with his own forces only, he should have done it: but if he was not, he ought not upon any consideration to have divided it with another. And if the division of Lombardy which he shared with the Venetians may in some measure be excused, because he got sooting in Italy merely by that means; yet the partition of Naples with the King of Spain cannot be defended at any rate, as he was not under the same necessity of acting in that manner.

Lewis then was guilty of five errors in this expedition; for he ruined the inferior States; he suffered a neighbouring Prince, who was before too potent, to increase his dominions; he introduced another, and a foreigner too, into the same Province, who was still more powerful; he neither staid to reside there himself, nor settled any Colonies: all which errors might yet possibly have been remedied whilst he lived, if he had not committed a Sixth in depressing the power of the Venetians. For if he had neither thrown too much weight into the scale of the Church, nor introduced the Spaniards into Italy, it would have been but right and necessary to humble them: but when he had taken those steps, he should not have suffered their power to be diminished; because whilst that continued respectable, they would always have endeavoured to prevent any one else from making further acquisitions in Lombardy, by which they themselves would not be benefited; since it could not be expected that the new invaders would strip the French of what they had got possession of there, merely to give it away to them: nor was there any occasion to apprehend that any other state would be hardy enough to contend with them both whilst they continued united. But if it be objected that Lewis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the Kingdo m of Naples to the Spaniards in order to evade a war, I say again, that a prefent inconvenience ought never to be fubmitted to, merely to prevent a war; for the war instead of being entirely averted thereby, will only be deferred and fall so much the heavier at last. Others perhaps may alledge that King Lewis had given his word to the Pope that he would affist him in his designs upon Romagna, in return for the diffolution of his marriage [y], and the favour of a Cardinal's

another." Ego te ad imperium voco; in tuâ manu positum est . . . Torpere ultra, & perdendam Rempublicam relinquere, sopor & ignavia videretur, etiamsi tibi quam inhonesta, tam tuta servitus esset." Hist. ii.

[y] Lewis XII. was more eager to enter into a strict alliance with Pope Alexander VI. than any other Prince, for several reasons: one of which was, that he wanted to be