

sary to have some allies likewise on his side. If Lewis XIV of France, the most puissant and formidable Prince in Europe of his time, was reduced to the very brink of ruin by a war in which he had engaged, to secure the succession to the crown of Spain to his family, and could no longer make head against so many other powers as had united against him, because he was not supported by any confederate; much less can any inferior Prince hope to stand upon his own legs, or to oppose others without extreme danger, except he has good alliances to depend upon. It is often said, but inconsiderately indeed, that Treaties of alliance are of no use; as the articles are seldom observed, and that there is no more regard paid to them in our times than in any other. But in answer to this, though it must be allowed that there are several examples of Princes in ancient as well as in modern times, who have not been exactly punctual in the performance of their engagements, yet there is great advantage to be reaped from such Treaties. The allies with whom you contract would otherwise perhaps be so many enemies; and if they will give you no assistance, they are obliged at least to observe a neutrality for a certain time.

Machiavel, as may be observed in the next place, speaks of little Princes, Sovereigns in miniature, whose territories are so small that they cannot bring an army into the field: and in this case, he lays great stress upon fortifying their Capital, and shutting up themselves and their troops there in time of war. Such Princes are but a sort of Hermaphrodites, partly Sovereigns, and partly private men; [their sphere of Royalty is very contracted: and if they are surrounded by neighbours no stronger than themselves, they are in the right of it to fortify their little insignificant towns: two Bastions and two hundred Soldiers will defend them against their neighbours as effectually, as a number of strong fortresses and an hundred thousand men would secure one of the greatest Monarchs. But if these Lords are in the same circumstances that the Barons of France and England formerly were, I should think that troops and fortified towns would only serve to ruin instead of aggrandizing them. The pomp and ostentation of Sovereignty is a dangerous thing, when power is wanting to support it: many a petty Lord [a] has ruined himself and his family by too fond an affectation of grandeur. To keep a body of troops on foot like an army, when one ought to have no more than a slender guard; to keep a guard, when one ought to be content with domestic Servants only, cannot be called the effect of ambition, but of downright va-

[a] The original says, "*Plus d'un Prince apanage;*" for which we have no word in our language. The substantive *apanage* signifies the portion of a Sovereign's younger children.