

has often been of fatal consequence, and many a battle has been lost, merely because a Prince would not suffer his allies to share in the glory of a Victory.] [p] It is certain, that a Prince ought not to depend upon Auxiliaries alone in his wars: but it is his duty to be an Auxiliary to others, and to put himself upon such a footing, that he may be able to send as effectual succours to his friends, as he has at any time received from them. It is but common prudence to fortify himself in such a manner, that he may have no occasion to fear either his enemies, or any body else: but if he enters into an alliance with others, he ought punctually to fulfil the terms of it. Whilst the Emperor of Germany, the English, and the Dutch, acted in concert against Lewis XIV. of France; whilst Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough continued firmly united together, they conquered all before them: but when England abandoned its Allies, the French King presently retrieved his losses.

Such powers as can do without either mixed or Auxiliary troops, act prudently in excluding both out of their armies: but as few States in Europe are in such circumstances, I think they run no risque in employing Auxiliaries, as long as the number of their national forces is superior to them. Machiavel lays down rules for the use of *petty* Princes only; and indeed all his notions seem to be *petty* and contracted: he does not reason like an honest man, and therefore we cannot expect to find any thing that is either great or solid in his arguments.—He that cannot support a war without the assistance of Subsidiary troops, will be forced to proceed in a very feeble manner; but he that acts in conjunction with allies, may do great things. The Expedition (for instance) in which three northern powers [q] deprived Charles XII. of Sweden of some part of his German dominions, was carried on by the forces of different crowns united in alliance: and the war which the French began in the year 1734, under a pretext of supporting the rights of the unfortunate Stanislaus, was jointly sup-

[p] Instead of what is included in the two crotchets above, the first Edition runs thus, “L’experience nous fait voir que le premier soin des hommes est celui de leur bien etre; ce que detruit entierement le paralogisme emphatique de l’Auteur.—En approfondissant cette Maxime de Machiavel, on trouvera peut-etre que ce n’est qu’une jalousie extreme qu’il suffira d’inspirer aux Princes: c’est cependant la jalousie de ces mêmes Princes envers leurs Generaux, ou envers des auxiliaires, qu’ils ne vouloient pas attendre, crainte de partager leur gloire, qui de tout tems fut tres prejudiciable à leurs interêts. Une infinité de batailles ont etè perdues par cette raison, & des petites jalousies ont souvent plus fait de tort aux Princes que le nombre superieur & les avantages de leurs ennemis.”

[q] The Poles, Danes, Ruffians, and Brandenburgers, were at that time (i. e. in the year 1700) confederated against Charles XII. of Sweden; but none of them reaped any great harvest of laurels from that League, as is here suggested; Augustus King of Poland, in particular, was defeated in several battles by the Swedes, who deposed him, and advanced Stanislaus to the throne of Poland in the year 1704.

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