

self still higher by the very means which they took to destroy him [r]. For this reason, some have been of opinion that a wise Prince, upon certain occasions, should artfully excite feeble insurrections against himself, by quelling which, he will become stronger and more formidable than he was before [s].

Princes, and particularly new ones, have generally found those men more faithful and serviceable to them at last, whom they suspected in the beginning of their reign, than others on whom they put most confidence at first. Pandolpho Petrucci, Lord of Siena, governed that state chiefly by the assistance of such as he had once suspected. Much, however, cannot be said with any certainty of this matter; as it must vary of course, according to the times and circumstances of things: I shall only add, therefore, that if those persons that are disaffected to a Prince at the beginning of his government, are such as stand in need of his favour to support them, they may easily be gained; and they will always be very officious in serving him afterwards, because they know that such a degree of assiduity is necessary to cancel the prejudice he had conceived against them; so that he will reap greater advantage from their diligence, than from others who think themselves more secure of his favour, and consequently will be apt to neglect his affairs [t]. But since the nature of the Subject in some measure seems to require it, I cannot help advising a Prince, who has newly made himself master of a state, by a correspondence with the natives, to consider well, what motives could induce them to lend him their assistance: for if it did not proceed from real affection for him, but disgust to the former Government, it will be exceeding difficult to keep them his friends; because he will find it impossible ever to satisfy them [u]. Many examples

[r] As she did to Tiberius, whose life, before he came to be Emperor, was full of dangers and troubles. "Casus primâ ab infantiâ ancipites . . . . Ubi domum Augusti privignus introiit multis æmulis conflictatus est, dum Marcellus & Agrippa, mox Caius Luciusque Cæsares viguere . . . . Sed Maxime in lubrico egit, acceptâ in matrimonium Juliâ, impudicitiam uxoris tolerans, aut declinans." *Tacit. Annal. 6.* And to Caractacus, "quem multa ambigua, multa prospera extulerant, ut cæteros Britannorum Imperatores præmineret." *Annal. 12.* And to that Roman Captain, whom the vicissitudes of good and bad fortune had made intrepid in all changes. "Cæcina secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens, eoque interritus." *Annal. 1.*

[s] This, perhaps, might be Diogenes's meaning when he said, *it was necessary to have enemies*.—It may be proper, according to human prudence, for a Prince to force his private enemies into open action, if they are not too numerous; that so he may suppress them, or at least prevent them from doing him more mischief in secret, than they could do openly.—This seems to be the meaning of *certain occasions* here. But is it necessary to *excite*, to create enemies, on purpose only to cut them off?

[t] Thus Marius Celsus proved faithful to Otho, though he had been a firm friend to Galba. "Marium Celsum Conf. Galbæ usque in extremas res amicum fidumque." *Tacit. Hist. 1.* "Otho inter intimos habuit . . . . mansitque Celso velut fataliter etiam pro Othone fides integra." *ibid.*

[u] "Multi odio præsentium & cupidine mutationis." *Tacit. Annal. 3.* "Privatas spes agitantes, sine publicâ curâ." *Hist. 1.*