

imagine, to be deceived by men, whose mutual hatred and suspicion keeps them equally upon their guard. But if their animosities produce this effect, they likewise are attended with another of very dangerous consequence: for the Ministers, instead of concurring, as they ought to do, in the service of their Master, are continually quarrelling and thwarting each other, to the great prejudice of his government and Subjects, whilst they mix their own private differences with those of their Prince, in order to wreak their revenge upon one another more effectually.—Nothing then contributes so much to the strength of a Monarchy as an intimate and indissoluble union of all its Members; and therefore it ought to be one of the chief endeavours of a wise Prince to establish such harmony amongst them.

What I have said by way of answer to Machiavel's third Question, may in some measure serve as a solution to the fourth: however, let us not pass it over altogether unnoticed, though but a very brief; or indeed no discussion at all is necessary, to convince any one, whether it is better for a Prince to excite factions and discontents against himself, or to gain the love and confidence of his Subjects. To make enemies only to subdue them, would be the same as raising Monsters merely for the sake of fighting them. Is it not much more natural, more rational, and humane to create friends? Happy are the Princes who know the sweets of friendship! still more happy are those that have merited the affections of their people!

We are now come to the last Question, viz. whether it is better for a Prince to build Fortresses and Citadels, or to demolish them?—I think I have spoken my opinion already pretty freely in the tenth Chapter of this Essay with regard to petty Princes: let us now see how far great and powerful Kings are concerned in the matter.—The World in Machiavel's time was in a general ferment: a Spirit of Sedition and revolt reigned every where: there was nothing to be seen but faction and Tyranny. Frequent, and almost continual revolutions obliged Princes to build Citadels upon eminencies near towns, to bridle the rebellious disposition of their Subjects. But since that turbulent age, whether it is because men are grown weary of destroying each other, or that Sovereigns have a more uncontrouled and despotic power in their States, we hear but of few Seditions and revolts; and one may venture to say, that that restless spirit being tired out after so much agitation, has at last subsided into a perfect calm: so that there is now no longer any occasion for Citadels in a Country to secure the fidelity of the natives. But the same cannot be said of Fortresses that are designed to guard it against foreign enemies, and to establish its tranquility upon a lasting foundation in that respect. Armies and Fortresses are of equal service to a Prince: for as he is enabled by his forces to make head
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