

conducts itself in the several cases that daily occur : as in the first place in our judgments concerning true and false ; secondly, in our determinations in relation to good and evil ; and finally, in indifferent matters. These particulars are necessary in order to be acquainted with the nature, use, and extent of liberty.

With regard to truth, we are formed in such a manner, that as soon as evidence strikes the mind, we are no longer at liberty to suspend our judgment. Vain would be the attempt to resist this sparkling light ; it absolutely forces our assent. Who, for example, could pretend to deny that the whole is greater than its part, or that harmony and peace are preferable, either in a family or state, to discord, tumults and war ?

The same cannot be affirmed in regard to things, that have less perspicuity and evidence ; for in these the use of liberty displays itself in its full extent. 'Tis true our mind inclines naturally to that side which seems the most probable ; but this does not debar it from suspending its assent in order to seek for new proofs, or to refer the whole inquiry to another opportunity. The obscurer things are, the more we are at liberty to hesitate, to suspend, or defer our determinations. This is a point sufficiently evinced by experience. Every day, and at every step, as it were, disputes arise, in which the arguments on both sides leave us, by reason of our limited capacity, in a kind of doubt and equilibrium, which permits us to suspend our judgment, to examine the thing anew, and to incline the balance at length to one side more than the other. We find, for example,  
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