

step ; lost in fine, and bewildered in an inextricable labyrinth.

X. Thus we are conducted naturally to the first idea of the word *Right*, which in its most general sense, and that to which all the particular significations bear some relation, is nothing else but whatever reason certainly acknowledges as a sure and concise means of attaining happiness, and approves as such.

What is
Right in ge-
neral ?

This definition is the result of the principles hitherto established. In order to be convinced of its exactness, we have only to draw these principles together, and unite them under one prospect. In fact, since right (*droit*) in its primary notion signifies whatever directs, or is well directed ; since direction supposes a scope and end, to which we are desirous of attaining ; since the ultimate end of man is happiness ; and, in fine, since he cannot attain to happiness but by the help of reason ; does it not evidently follow, that Right in general is whatever reason approves as a sure and concise means of acquiring happiness ? 'Tis likewise in consequence of these principles, that reason giving its approbation to itself, when it happens to be properly cultivated, and arrived to that state of perfection in which it knows how to use all its discernment, bears, by way of preference or excellence, the appellation of right reason, as being the first and surest means of direction whereby man is enabled to acquire felicity.

That we may not forget any thing in the analysis of these first ideas, 'tis proper to observe here, that the Latins express what we call *Right* by the