SECTION II.

Of the ORIGIN of IDEAS.

d

VERY one will readily allow, that there is a con-Inderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the fenses; but they never can reach entirely the force and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or fee it: But except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The must lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may observe a like distinction to run thro' all the other perceptions of the mind. A man, in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person